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Nearly 3.5 million American school children participate in special edu-
cation programs.' Recent enrollment figures indicate that black students
nationwide are more often assigned to special education classes than are
any other racial or ethnic group.' Of the four categories of handicapped
children served by special education classes' black students form the
I. L. Hayes & J. Loewen, The Rights of School Children 5 (1980) (unpublished manu-
script prepared for the Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education) [hereinafter
cited as The Rights of School Children]. Only six percent of the children receiving special
education are affected by physical impairments such as deafness, blindness, and orthopedic
disabilities. The majority of special education students are enrolled in programs for educa-
tional handicaps, including programs for speech disabilities, specific learning disabilities,
emotional disorders, and mental retardation. Id. at 6. Until recently, states were under no
obligation to provide public educational benefits for handicapped children. In 1972, two
court cases laid the groundwork for handicapped children's right to an education. The first,
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Mentally Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (P.A.R.C.), 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), was a class action claiming that a state statute which excluded
mentally retarded children from public schools violated the fourteenth amendment. In a
consent decree, the state agreed to provide equal access to appropriate education to all chil-
dren and to provide procedural safeguards for the classification of children as mentally re-
tarded. In the second case, Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), held
that the exclusion of physically, mentally, and emotionally disturbed children from public
schools violated the fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protection and due process.
After these two decisions, 46 similar cases were instituted in 28 states, H.R. REP. No. 332,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975). See, e.g., Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children and
Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Panitch v. Wisconsin, 390 F. Supp. 611
(E.D. Wis. 1974).
2. As of 1978, 8.4% of all black school children were in special education programs, as
compared to 7.53% of American Indians, 5.88% of whites, 5.83% of Hispanics, and 3.7% of
Asian Americans. The Rights of School Children, supra note 1, at 25.
3. Under the regulations for the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA),
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976) there are four categories of educational handicaps:
(1)"Speech impaired" means a communication disorder such as stuttering, impaired articu-
lation, or a voice or language impairment which adversely affects educational performance,
45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(10) (1979); (2)"Specific learning disability" means a disorder in one or
more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language
that can manifest itself in an inability to listen, spell, think, read, write, or do mathematical
calculations. This term does not include children who have learning problems that result
primarily from visual, hearing or motor handicaps, mental retardation, emotional distur-
Catholic University Law Review
greatest percentage of the two types of mental retardation: the educable
mentally retarded (EMR) and the trainable mentally retarded (TMR).
Most black special education students are in EMR classes.4  In fact, the
percentage of the total black student population assigned to EMR is al-
most twice that of any other racial or ethnic group.'
Traditionally, intelligence quotient (I.Q.) tests were the primary, and
sometimes the sole method, used to determine mental retardation.6 Now,
federal regulations prohibit the exclusive use of I.Q. tests.7 While I.Q. tests
are generally still considered relevant, there is disagreement concerning
their reliability in classifying children as mentally retarded.8 The use of
I.Q. tests for the placement of black children in special education classes
bances or of environmental, cultural or economic disadvantage, 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(9)
(1979); (3)"Seriously emotionally disturbed" means exhibiting over a long period of time an
inability to learn unexplained by health factors, an inability to establish normal interper-
sonal relationships or maintain normal emotional stability, and a tendency to develop physi-
cal symptons or fears associated with personal or school problems, 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(8)
(1979); (4)"Mental retardation" means significantly subaverage general intellectual func-
tioning existing concurrently with defects in a child's behavior which adversely affect educa-
tional performance, 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(4) (1979). The last category, mental retardation, is
further broken down for federal record collecting purposes into "Educable" and "Trainable
mentally retarded." "Educable mentally retarded" (EMR) includes pupils who are educable
in the academic, social, and occupational areas but who may need moderate supervision.
OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE, INDI-
VIDUAL SCHOOL REPORT FROM US/CR 102 (May 1978). "Trainable mentally retarded"
(TMR) applies to pupils capable of very limited achievement in the traditional basic aca-
demic skills but trainable in self-care and simple vocational skills. Id.
4. Of the 8.4% of all black public school children who are in special education pro-
grams, about 3.45% are in EMR classes. The Rights of School Children, supra note I, at 20.
5. The percentage breakdown for national EMR placement of other racial and ethnic
groups are American Indian, 1.7%; white, 1.06%; Hispanic, .97%; and Asian American, .37%.
Id
6. See F. WEINTRAUB, A. ABESON & D. BRADDOCK, STATE LAW AND EDUCATION OF
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 28 (1971).
7. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(3)(b) (1979).
8. There are basically three perspectives on the relevancy of I.Q. tests. Some propo-
nents assert that the test score differences between blacks and whites reflect an innate differ-
ence in the intellectual capacities of the races. See Jensen, How Much Can We Boost 1.9.
and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARV. EDuc. REV. I (1969), and Hernstein, 1 Q., THE AT-
LANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1971, at 43.
Others believe that properly used 1.Q. tests are reasonably accurate predictors of current
intellectual functioning and serve a beneficial if not necessary purpose in the educational
setting. See Alsehuler, Education for the Handicapped, 7 J.L. AND EDUC. 523 (1978); Kirp,
Schools as Sorters.- The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classifications, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 705 (1973).
The third position asserts that all measured differences in intelligence between social
classes and races are due to cultural biases in the tests or testing situations. See Garcia,/. Q.."
The Conspiracy, 6 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 40 (1972); Comment, Segregation of Poor and Mi-
nority Children into Classes for the Mentally Retarded by the Use of 1.Q. Tests, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 1212 (1973).
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for the mentally retarded is particularly controversial because blacks have
traditionally scored one standard deviation below the norm on standard-
ized intelligence tests.9 Thus, use of the tests to determine mental retarda-
tion impacts more harshly on blacks than whites. Such a disproportionate
impact, therefore, suggests that their use may be racially discriminatory.
The question of discrimination in the use of I.Q. tests to classify black
children as EMR was recently discussed in the opinions of two federal
district courts. In Larry P. v. Riles,' ° black California school children
charged that the state's use of I.Q. tests was racially and culturally biased
because it resulted in blacks comprising a greater percentage of EMR stu-
dents than of the total student body. " According to the plaintiffs, this
disparate impact violated their rights under the fourteenth amendment,' 2
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'" and the Education for All Hand-
icapped Children Act (EHA). 14 Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that
the I.Q. tests had not been validated as sufficiently accurate methods for
classifying children as EMR, as required by both the EHA and the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 regulations.' 5 The Larry P. court found that the
current I.Q. tests were racially and culturally biased and held for the plain-
tiffs on each legal theory.
A case factually similar to Larry P. was litigated in a federal court in
Illinois. In Parents in Action on Special Education v. Hannon (PA. SE.),' 6
plaintiffs brought a class action alleging discrimination in the Chicago
school system, where black school children constituted twenty percent
more of the EMR program than of the total student body. ' 7 The plaintiffs
claimed that the I.Q. tests used in the school district's classification process
were racially and culturally biased and thereby violated their rights under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the Equal Educational Opportu-
nities Act of 1974,'9 and the EHA.20 As in Larry P, the plaintiffs also
charged that the use of I.Q. tests violated federal regulations because the
9. A. SHUEY, THE TESTING OF NEGRO INTELLIGENCE (2d ed. 1966).
10. [1979] 3 EHLR 551:295 (N.D. Cal.).
11. Id at 297.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
15. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.35(b)(1), 121a.532(2) (1979).
16. [1980] 3 EHLR 552:108 (N.D. Ill.).
17. Id at 552:109. Illinois school systems use the term "educable mentally handi-
capped" instead of the more common term, EMR.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976).
20. Id § 1412(5)(c) (1976).
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tests had not been properly validated.2' In P.A.S., however, the court,
using a single method of analyzing individualized test items, found that
the plaintiffs failed to prove that the overrepresentation in EMR classes
was the result of I.Q. tests or racial discrimination.
Since the constitutional ramifications of intelligence testing have been
discussed at length elsewhere,2 2 this Note will focus only on the applica-
tion of the Title VI and the EHA antidiscrimination provisions 23 to in-
21. Plaintiffs Post-Trial Memorandum, at 10-11, Parents in Action on Special Educa-
tion v. Hannon, [1980] 3 EHLR 552:108 (W.D. 111.). See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.35(b)(l),
121a.532(a)(2) (1979).
22. See Kirp, supra note 8; Shea, An Educational Perspecitive of the Legality of Intelli-
gence Testing and Ability Grouping, 6 J.L. AND EDUC. 137 (1977); Comment, Equal Protec-
tion and Intelligence Classification, 26 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1974); Comment, supra note 8;
Note, The Legal Implications of Cultural Bias in the Intelligence Testing of Disadvantaged
School Children, 61 GEO. L. REV. 1027 (1973).
A thorough examination of the fourteenth amendment intent standard is also beyond the
scope of this Note. In summary, under the fourteenth amendment, intent to discriminate
must be proven in order to establish a constitutional violation. Thus, disparate racial impact
resulting from proof of discriminatory intent is needed to constitute a fourteenth amend-
ment violation. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (employment testing). The dis-
criminatory intent requirement has been applied to situations of de facto school segregation.
E.g. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
An unresolved issue, however, is to what extent the foreseeability of a discriminatory ef-
fect is an index of discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court identified discriminatory effect
as a mark of discriminatory intent, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977), and has suggested that foreseeability of discriminatory
effect alone is insufficient to establish discriminatory intent. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443
U.S. at 464. See generally Comment, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative
Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976); Comment, Proving
Discriminatory Intent from a Facially Neutral Decision with a Disproportionate Impact, 36
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109 (1979).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) and 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(c) (1976). The other theory of
statutory recovery offered by both Larry P. and PA. SE plaintiffs, § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979) is not developed in this Note. Section 504
prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons in federally funded projects. In both
its structure and its language, § 504 parallels Title VI. See Meiner v. State, [1980] 3 EHLR
551:512, 512-14. Although the Supreme Court has recognized private suits under § 504, it
has never ruled whether an implied private right of action exists under the statute. South-
eastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404 n.5 (1979). Accord, Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 282-84 (1978) (private right of action under Title VI
assumed only for purposes of the case). Lower courts, however, have repeatedly found a
private right of action under § 504. See, e.g., Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir.
1977) (per curiam); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977);
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Doe v. Colautti, 454 F.
Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
In both Larry P. and P.A.S.E, the plaintiffs alleged that the failure to validate the I.Q.
tests violated § 504 regulations. The Larry P. court ruled for the plaintiffs; the PA.SE.
court dismissed the suit without ruling on the issue. Since the language of the § 504 regula-
tion, 45 C.F.R. § 84.35(b)(1) (1979), is identical to that of the Education for All Handi-
[Vol. 30:335
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stances of disproportionate racial impact resulting from I.Q. testing for
EMR placement. The Note will examine theories of prima facie discrimi-
nation under Title VI and the EHA, as defined by Larry F., P.A.S.E., and
other recent case law, and will propose an effects-test theory for discerning
prima facie discrimination under the EHA based on an analogous statu-
tory analysis employed by the Supreme Court.
I. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON EDUCATIONAL TESTING AND
DISCRIMINATION
A. Constitutional Origins
The potential discriminatory effect of the use of intelligence tests 24 to
classify school children as EMR has been a frequent source of legal con-
troversy. After Brown v. Board of Education25 prohibited de jure public
school segregation, courts initially gave great deference to the school dis-
tricts' use of intelligence tests. Courts allowed school districts discretion to
use tests which resulted in the de facto segregation of white and black chil-
dren if the decision to use the tests were based on a legitimate educational
purpose.26
Later, a series of cases arose in the Fifth Circuit charging school districts
with thwarting court-ordered desegregation by using intelligence tests to
resegregate students.27 In these cases, the court considered whether the de
facto segregation in the school districts using intelligence tests was discrim-
inatory and balanced the educational justification for intelligence testing
against the resulting discriminatory impact. While the Fifth Circuit never
ruled that intelligence tests were invalid as classification tools per se,28 it
capped Children Act (EHA) regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(2) (1979), it may be assumed
that standards for test validation under EHA regulations would be the same under § 504
regulations.
24. Courts have not always distinguished between I.Q. tests and other standardized tests
in using the term "intelligence tests." For the purposes of this article, "intelligence tests" will
refer to all standardized tests used to classify school children according to their mental abil-
ity. The term "I.Q. tests" will refer to those explicitly used to secure an intelligence quotient.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61-62 (5th Cir.
1964) (educatorsmay make individual assignments to particular schools on basis of intelli-
gence or other aptitudes). See also Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957)
(children may. be separated for legitimate educational or health reasons).
27. See McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975); Moses v.
Washington Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972); Lemon v. Bossier Parish
School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist.,
419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), rev'dper curiam on other grounds sub nom.,
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 226 (1970).
28. Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971) (testing
19811
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suspended their use until it was shown that the tests were not discrimina-
tory.29
Perhaps the most celebrated educational testing case is Hobson v. Han-
sen." In Hobson, the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia ruled that the four-tiered tracking system used by the Washington,
D.C. public school system violated the fifth amendment right of black and
poor school children to equal educational opportunity.3' The Hobson
court found that blacks were significantly overrepresented in the lower
tracks which focused on self-help and vocational training.32 Since there
was little movement from the slower tracks into the faster tracks initial
classification acted as an essentially permanent limitation on educational
opportunities. 33 This result, according to the court, made the use of place-
ment procedures that were accurate measures of the maximum potential of
school children critical to the validity of the teaching system.34
Ability grouping in Hobson was based on student scores on various in-
telligence tests.35 According to the court, these tests were standardized on
may be valid, but should not be employed unless the school district had operated as a uni-
tary system for a minimum of several years); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. School Dist., 419
F.2d 1211, 1219 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), rev'dper curiam on other grounds sub nom.,
Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 226 (1970) (no ruling on test validity
until unitary school system is established). But see Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd.,
330 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (E.D. La. 1971), aftd, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1013 (1972) (where the educational tracking policy began the same year as total inte-
gration and where compensatory education was nonexistent, a permanent injunction against
using I.Q. tests to make classroom assignments was justified).
29. McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1975) (class-
room assignment by intelligence testing resulting in racial segregation barred until the dis-
trict had operated without a tracking system for long enough to assure that slower tracked
students were not suffering from the effects of prior educational discrimination).
30. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), a9'd sub. nom., Smuck v.' Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
31. 269 F. Supp. at 443.
32. The court considered figures showing that the district-wide ratio of blacks to whites
in the slowest track in elementary schools was approximately 95 to 5. Id at 456-57. Racial
data on the composition of the other tracks was not kept. Figures showed, however, that
there were significantly more slower tracks and fewer honors programs in black schools than
in predominantly white schools. Id at 451-52. The court also found that a high correlation
between lower socio-economic status and placement in the slower tracks did not negate the
finding of racial discrimination. Instead, it provided an alternative basis for equitable relief.
Id at 513. Cf. notes 121-26 and accompanying text infra.
33. 269 F. Supp. at 463.
34. Id at 475.
35. Among the tests used were the Metropolitan Readiness and Achievement Tests, Se-
quential Tests of Educational Progress (STEP), School and College Ability Tests (SCAT),
Standford Achievement Tests (SAT), Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability, Beta, Tests of
General Ability (TOGA), Tests of Educational Ability, and Flanagan Aptitude Classifica-
[Vol. 30:335
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white middle-class students, 36 making them unreliable methods of evaluat-
ing the intellectual capacity of those outside the white middle-class cul-
ture.3 7 The court also pointed out that significant environmental and
psychological factors operated adversely on disadvantaged children during
testing. 38 As a result, many students were classified on the basis of cultural
background rather than intellectual levels, the purported basis of the track-
ing system. The court therefore concluded that the tests were not ration-
ally related to the objective of proper classification.39
The first cases challenging the use of I.Q. tests in EMR placement were
brought in the early 1970's. In each case, minority school children errone-
ously classified EMR, filed class actions against school districts having a
significantly higher percentage of minorities in the EMR program than in
the general school population. The plaintiffs charged that the I.Q. tests
were racially and culturally biased against minorities and that their use
constituted a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Although these suits
resulted in consent agreements providing due process protection for both
students and parents, no agreements to discontinue or specifically limit the
use of I.Q. tests were made.4°
tion Tests. Only one of these tests, the Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability, Beta, resulted in
the ascertainment of an intelligence quotient. Id at 518-19.
36. Id at 479, "Standardization" is to arrange or order component items of a test so that
the probability of their eliciting a designated class of response correlates with some quantifi-
able psychological or behavioral attribute of the child. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1976). For a discussion of the standardization of I.Q. tests, see notes 74-75
infra.
37. 269 F.Supp. at 514.
38. Id. at 480-82. Among the factors identified by the court were non-familiarity with
proper English, crowded living conditions, and lack of educational stimulation at an early
age. The court also found that disadvantaged children are also more prone to low self-es-
teem and test anxiety. Id.
39. Id. at 513. Hobson has been criticized for its wholesale condemnation of educa-
tional tracking when it should have addressed the narrower issue of the tracking system's
abuse. See Kirp, supra note 8, at 721-22; Shea, supra note 22, at 151-52.
40. In Diana v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. C-70-37 RFR (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 1970),
Mexican-American children classified as EMR charged that the 1.Q. tests used were prejudi-
cial because they were standardization on predominantly white, middle class language and
culture. The plaintiffs were able to show a disproportionate enrollment of Mexican-Ameri-
cans in the district's EMR classes. Furthermore, when retested in their primary language,
seven of the nine plaintiffs tested out of EMR. The consent decree required that the school
district give I.Q. tests in the children's primary language and that it send an explanatory
report to the state department of education when a disparity occurred between the percent-
ages of Mexican-Americans in EMR classes and in the regular school population. For a
summary of this suit, see Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Educationfor 4l Handicapped
Children: .4 Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1052-53 (1971-72).
These settlement provisions were later codified. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56506 (West 1977).
In 1976, the legislature extended the monitoring of disproportionate student enrollment to
1981]
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B. Statutory Prohibitions on Educational Testing Discrimination
1. Educationfor All Handicapped Children Act. Uncertainty
Surrounding the Standards of Proof
In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (EHA).4 1 The EHA provided funding for local special education pro-
grams in states that had submitted to the U.S. Department of Education
special education plans which complied with the Act's eligibility provi-
sions.42 The EHA contains an antidiscrimination clause requiring that
testing and evaluative materials used to classify handicapped children "be
selected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally discrimina-
tory."43 Under EHA regulations, these classifying procedures must also be
validated, or shown to be sufficiently accurate mechanisms in fulfilling the
purpose for which they are used." The standards of proof for these two
EHA provisions are not specified by statute and were not litigated prior to
Larry P. and PA.SE .4 5
the racial composition of special education classes. Id § 56509. Similarly, Stewart v. Phil-
lip, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass., filed Sept. 14, 1971), was a class action brought by seven
erroneously classified black children challenging the use of I.Q. scores in EMR placement.
They sought to enjoin testing until a commission was established to oversee testing and
classification. A subsequent retesting of "mentally retarded" minority children in the Bos-
ton area showed that 50% had been erroneously classified. For a summary of the suit, see
Note, supra note 23, at 1056 n.158. Shortly after Stewart was settled, Massachusetts passed a
law establishing due process rights for parents and children during the classification process,
but did not make specific references to the use of I.Q. tests. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 15,
§ IM (1974).
41. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976). For a complete discussion of the EHA and its im-
plementing regulations, see Baugh, The Federal Legislation Equal Educational Opportunity
for the Handicapped, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 65 (1978); Shepard, The Repudiation of Plato. A
Lawyer's Guide to the Educational Rights of Handicapped Children, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 781
(1979); Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education. The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103 (1979).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976). In 1979, the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare
was eliminated and the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Dept. of
Education were created. Id §§ 3508, 3411. HEW'S Office of Education and the educational
functions of HEW's Office of Civil Rights were transferred to the new U.S. Dept. of Educa-
tion. Id § 3441(2)(3).
43. Id § 1412(5)(c) (1976). The Act requires states to have:
procedures to assure that testing and evaluative materials and procedures utilized
for the purposes of evaluation and placement of handicapped children will be se-
lected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory. Such
materials or procedures shall be provided and administered in the child's native
language or mode of communication, unless it is clearly not feasible to do so, and
no single procedure shall be the sole criterion for determining an appropriate edu-
cational program for a child.
Id.
44. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532 (1979).
45. The only mention of a standard of proof in the EHA is in 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976),
[Vol. 30:335
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2 Title VI. What Standard of Prooffor Disparate Racial Impact?
Each school receiving EHA funding is also subject to Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,46 which prohibits discrimination in federally as-
sisted projects. 47 Title VI's implementing regulations prohibit the use of
"criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
an individual to discrimination because of race.",48 While no court has
ruled that a disproportionate enrollment of minorities in EMR classes con-
stitutes a violation of Title VI, at least one federal agency charged with
enforcing Title VI has indicated that this statute is subject to such an inter-
pretation.49
Case law is unclear as to whether a showing of disparate racial impact is
sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VI or whether addi-
tional proof of discriminatory intent is necessary. In 1974, the Supreme
Court ruled in Lau v. Nichols5" that the San Francisco School District's
refusal to provide remedial English classes for children of Chinese ances-
try violated Title VI implementing regulations.'I The Court held that lack
of language training had an adverse impact on non-English speaking Chi-
nese-American students and denied them "a meaningful opportunity to
which establishes mandatory due process procedures to safeguard the rights of parents and
children during the classification process. A party contesting the placement decision can
bring suit in federal court, and bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the placement decision was erroneous. Id § 1415(e)(2). These procedural safe-
guards must be part of the state's plan in order to qualify for federal funds. Id. § 1412
(1979). However, the standard of proof required by § 1415 does not necessarily apply to all
eligibility clauses or to the EHA regulations. See Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130
(1979) (different clauses in the eligibility provisions of the Emergency School Aid Act incor-
porate different standards of proof of discrimination).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
47. Section § 2000d states: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance."
48. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1979).
49. M. GERRY, OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, IDENTIFICATION OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF CHILDREN TO SPE-
CIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, 2-3 (1975) (disproportionate under or over-enrollment of chil-
dren of any race, color, or national origin in any special program category may indicate non-
compliance with Title VI). The Office of Civil Rights at the U.S. Dept. of Education has
recently restated this interpretation. See Complaint Letter of Finding from William A.
Thomas, Director, OCR, Region IV to James C. Edwards, Superintendent of Hendry
County School District (Sept. 28, 1979) reprinted in [1979] 2 EHLR 257:41; Compliance
Letter of Finding from OCR, Region VII to Special School District of St. Louis County, Mo.
(Mar. 27, 1978) reprintedin [1978] 2 EHLR 255:05.
50. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
51. Id at 563-69. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.3(b)(1), (2); 80.5(b) (1979).
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participate in the educational program."52 In defining the elements of a
prima facie violation of Title VI, the Court held that "discrimination is
barred which has that effect, even though no purposeful design is pres-
ent. . . ."" The Court rested its finding of discrimination on HEW's
guidelines for Title VI. These guidelines place an affirmative duty on
school districts receiving federal aid to "rectify the language deficiency of
its students."54 Thus, in Lau, the Supreme Court appeared to set a stan-
dard of discriminatory effect for Title VI cases.55
The strength of the Lau precedent, however, is uncertain in light of sub-
sequent Supreme Court action. In a 1978 decision, Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,56 the Supreme Court held that special
admissions programs are not unconstitutionalper se, but that the Univer-
sity of California's race conscious special admissions program was unlaw-
ful.5 7 The court opinion, written by Justice Powell, also held that Title VI
proscribes only those racial classifications that would violate the constitu-
tion.18 Although Bakke concerned an explicit racial classification 59 rather
than a disparate impact, four justices indicated that for all purposes Title
VI and the fourteenth amendment were coextensive and that Title VI in-
corporated the constitutional standard of proof of discrimination an-
nounced in Washington v. Davis.6 Under the Davis standard,
discriminatory impact alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie viola-
52. 414 U.S. at 568.
53. Id.
54. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970). Three justices expressed doubt whether, standing alone,
"this laissez-faire attitude on the part of the school administrators" would constitute a Title
V1 violation, but found for the plaintiff on the basis that the interpretive guidelines pub-
lished by HEW did not exceed the agency's authorized enforcement powers. 414 U.S. at
570-71.
55. After Lau, several courts held that no intent was necessary to constitute a Title VI
violation. See, e.g., Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974)
(failure to provide bilingual education); Pabon v. Levine, 70 F.R.D. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (employment); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 386 F. Supp. 539, 545
(C.D. Cal. 1974) (desegregation).
56. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
57. Justice Powell was joined in a concurring opinion by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
White, and Blackmun in holding that race-concious admission programs are not unconstitu-
tional per se. Id at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Powell's ruling to affirm the en-
joining of the University of California's program was joined by Justices Stevens, Stewart,
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in a separate opinion. Id at 408 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
58. Id. at 287.
59. The special admissions program at the Medical School of the University of Califor-
nia at Davis never offered admission to disadvantaged whites and at one point explicitly
excluded whites from consideration. Id. at 274-76.
60. Id. at 352.
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tion of the fourteenth amendment. Purposeful or intentional discrimina-
tion must be shown.6'
Justice Powell, however, carefully distinguished Lau and its intent re-
quirements. He noted that Lau rested solely on Title VI, which had in
turn been interpreted by HEW to reach the discriminatory effect of certain
educational practices.62 Moreover, the preference given the petitioners in
Lau did not result in a "denial of a relevant benefit" to others.63 While the
other four justices expressed doubts as to the vitality of Lau, they did not
expressly overrule the decision.' They did limit its impact, however, to
permitting agencies administering Title VI to require recipients "to be cog-
nizant of the impact of their actions on racial minorities.
65
Although the Bakke intent standard for Title VI is only dicta and the
Court has since reiterated that the issue is still unresolved,66 since 1978
lower federal courts generally have interpreted Bakke to require Title VI
claimants to prove discriminatory intent.67 This past year, however, Lau
may have received new life from the Supreme Court in Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick .68
Fullilove upheld the constitutionality of the 1977 Public Works Employ-
ment Act provision requiring ten percent of the Act's four billion dollar
funding be set aside for minority-owned business enterprises (MBE's).6 9
The plurality opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, held that Con-
gress had the constitutional authority to create explicit racial classifications
for the purpose of remedying past discrimination, whether or not that dis-
61. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). See also note 20 supra.
62. 438 U.S. 265, 303-05 (1978).
63. Id. at 304.
64. Id. at 352.
65. Id at 351.
66. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 150 (1979) (proof of a Title VI violation
might differ from the discriminatory effects standard applicable to the Emergency School
Aid Act).
67. Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1979) (school desegregation); Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
(educational testing); Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 470 F. Supp. 326
(D.C. Colo. 1979) (employment); Valdez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149 (M.D. Fla. 1979)
(School desegregation); Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (1978), vacated and re-
manded, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servs. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp.
1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd in part [1980] 23 FEP 677 (2d Cir. July 25, 1980) (employment).
But see Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (hospital closing).
68. 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980). One federal court, in dicta, has cited Fullilo'e as upholding
an effects test for Title VI regulatory violations. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 616 (2d
Cir. 1980).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (Supp. I 1976).
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crimination stemmed from purposeful state action. ° According to the
Court, Lau served as the basis for concluding that Congress has the consti-
tutional authority to regulate "state action in the use of federal funds vol-
untarily sought and accepted by grantees subject to statutory and
administrative conditions."'"
II. LARR Y P. AND P.A. S.E.: AT ODDS ON DISCRIMINATION
A. Larry P. .- A Broad Definition of Discrimination
In 1971, black students who had been erroneously classified as EMR
brought a class action against the San Francisco United School District.72
The students alleged that the school district's use of I.Q. tests resulted in a
disproportionate impact on blacks and that the defendants had not rebut-
ted the evidence that the tests were biased.73 Judge Peckham issued a tem-
porary injunction prohibiting use of I.Q. tests for placement as long as
there was a racial imbalance in the EMR classes.74 The injunction was
later extended to cover the entire state of California.75 In 1977, the peti-
tioners amended their complaint to include violations of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EHA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,76, and sued for a total and
permanent injunction against using I.Q. tests in EMR placement. The
court permanently enjoined use of I.Q. tests to place black children with-
out court approval.77
Following the five-month trial of the case, Judge Peckham again found
that the impact of I.Q. tests was discriminatory. His decision rested on
70. 100 S. Ct. at 2774.
71. Id. at 2775.
72. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1974) (per curiam).
73. Id at 1308.
74. Id at 1314-15.
75. Larry P. v. Riles, [1979] 3 EHLR 551:295, 297 n.4.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
77. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:337-38. To secure court permission to resume use of stan-
dardized I.Q. tests, the State Board of Education had to submit its written determinations
that the tests were not racially or culturally discriminatory, were not administered so as to
have a discriminatory impact on black children, and had been validated for use in EMR
placement. The Board would have to support its findings with statistics showing the average
black and white student test scores, data supporting a finding of test validation, and proof of
public hearings on the reimplementation of testing. The school districts had to monitor the
EMR placement rates for white and black students and establish a three-year plan to elimi-
nate the disparity between white and black student enrollment in EMR. The defendants
would also have to notify the court of any district failing to remedy the racial imbalance
after the three-year period. Id
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four factual findings. He determined that I.Q. test scores played a predom-
inant role in the procedure used to classify students as EMR.78 Since
twenty-three percent of California's EMR students were black while only
ten percent of the general student body was black, he held that the use of
I.Q. tests had a disproportionate racial impact.79 In addition, he stated
that erroneous EMR classification could severely restrict a student's educa-
tional advancement because the EMR curriculum included only those ba-
sic academic skills necessary to make children socially adjusted and
economically productive,8" and because few EMR students ever returned
to the regular curriculum.8 Finally, the court, implicity employing a
broad definition of test bias,82 determined that the I.Q. tests were cultur-
ally biased against blacks.8 3 According to the court, the two most widely
used intelligence tests had not been designed for use on blacks; 4 the word-
78. Id. at 551:311.
79. Id at 551:305-07. In the 20 districts accounting for the 80% of the black enrollment
in California public schools, black students comprised 27.5% of the student population and
62% of the EMR population.
80. Id. at 551:304 (quoting STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, PROGRAMS FOR THE
EDUCABLE MENTALLY RETARDED 27 (1974)).
81. Id. at 551:305.
82. A test may be labeled culturally biased if: (1) the results are used unfairly; (2) a
distinct cultural bias exists in the test content or in the use of the test; (3) a systematic differ-
ence in the test scores exists among groups; or (4) items within the test are especially difficult
for one group relative to another. McClung, Competency Testing Programs: Legal and Edu-
cational Issues, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 651 (1979).
83. Larry P. v. Riles, [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:315-17.
84. Id. at 551:315. Both the Larry P. and PA.SE. courts specifically considered the
Wechseler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) and its revision (WISC-R), as well as the
Standford-Binet test. The WISC and the WISC-R are divided into 12 sub-tests of verbal
and visual skills, consisting of similar items that increase in difficulty. An examiner begins
questioning a child at a suggested starting point in each category that corresponds with the
child's chronological age. If the child answers the initial question correctly, he is given
credit for all previous test items. If the child fails to respond correctly, the examiner asks
questions of decreasing difficulty. To establish the I.Q. score, the number of points a child
scores on each sub-test is totaled and scaled. The Standford-Binet test consists of 18 sub-
tests, each geared to a chronological age level. Examiners begin questioning at a level where
the child is likely to respond correctly, but with some difficulty. From that point, the exam-
iner attempts to establish a basal level (the point just below the first mistake) and a ceiling
level (the point where all questions are missed). The difference will usually span several
sub-tests. A "mental age" is established by taking the basal age and adding all the credit the
child earned by answering correctly. See P.A.S.E. v. Hannon, [1980] 3 EHLR at 552:111-13.
Neither the WISC nor the Standford-Binet tests were designed for use on non-whites.
The designer of WISC once stated that his test would be inappropriate for use on blacks.
The WISC was revised in the early 1970's to eliminate a few questions that were viewed
universally as racially and culturally biased. The scoring norm of the revised test was also
restandardized on populations including minorities. The Standford-Binet test, designed in
1916, was standardized on only whites. Early users believed that the lower scores of minori-
ties reflected innate racial differences in intellectual capacity. In 1972, the test was
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ing of several individual test questions tended to discriminate against
blacks; 5 and a direct relationship existed between higher black test scores
and a greater exposure to white culture and language.8 6
The court noted that the defendants could defeat a finding of discrimi-
nation if they could prove that the disparity between white and black test
scores was attributable to educationally relevant differences between the
two groups.8 7 The defendants claimed that the tests were not racially or
culturally discriminatory but biased only against the poor. 8 The court
rejected the defense since there was no showing of a direct causal relation-
ship between poverty and mental retardation. 9 The court rejected the de-
fense on the basis of evidence that the risk of mental illness attributable to
the physical risks of poverty, such as malnutrition, could not alone account
for the racial disparity in the EMR classroom. 90
Alternatively, the defendants argued that culturally biased tests are le-
gitimate evaluative tools, indicative of the minority child's ability to com-
pete in the dominant culture.9 Judge Peckham also rejected this defense,
noting that exclusion from the majority culture could not justify a lable of
mental retardation.
92
Turning to the legal theories of discrimination, the court ruled that the
use of I.Q. tests constituted a violation of Title VI.93 Specifically, I.Q. test-
restandardized on populations including minorities, but there was no effort to determine
which questions were answered differently by blacks and whites. In 1937, both the WISC
and Standford-Binet tests were redesigned to eliminate disparities in scores between males
and females. Test items impacting more harshly on women were removed to insure identi-
cal median scores for men and women. Seegeneral y Larry P. v. Riles, 3 EHLR at 551:315-
16; P.A.S.E. v. Hannon, 3 EHLR at 552:118, 123-24; Amicus Curiae, Post-Trial Memoranda
of the United States Government at 7-13, Larry P. v. Riles, [1979] 3 EHLR 551:295 (N.D.
Cal.). No similar effort was ever made, however, to remove test questions yielding great
disparities between black and white test scores. The Larry P. court held that broadening the
test population without a systematic attempt to validate the individual test questions did not
eliminate the inherent cultural bias. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:316 n.64 & 65. The P.A.SE.
court, however, suggested that a restandardization of I.Q. tests similar to the restandardizing
of the tests for women would eliminate the utility of the test. [1979] 3 EHLR at 552:139.
85. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:317.
86. Id. at 551:316.
87. Id. at 551:314.
88. Id at 551:315.
89. Id
90. Id
91. Id at 551:318.
92. Id This conclusion is alluded to and later confirmed in the court's rejection of the
defendants' argument that I.Q. tests are good predictors of academic success. Mental retar-
dation, not potential success in society, was the question before the Larry P. court. Id. at
551:325.
93. Id at 551:322.
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ing violated the Title VI implementing regulation prohibiting the use of
"criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
an individual to discrimination because of their [sic] race."94 Relying on
Lau v. Nichols, the court found that the showing of disparate impact was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VI.95
Judge Peckham analogized Lau to the Larry P. facts, noting that errone-
ous classification into the restricted EMR curriculum could deny a child a
meaningful educational opportunity.96 As in Lau, the Larry P. court gave
great deference to an interpretive memorandum published by HEW which
essentially stated that failure to use classification procedures selected and
administered in a manner that is nondiscriminatory in its impact might
constitute a Title VI violation. 97 Thus, under the Lau effects-test standard,
the plaintiffs in Larry P. established a prima facie case of discrimination.
Judge Peckham then shifted to the school district the burden of rebutting
the inference that its actions were a substantial cause of the racial dispar-
ity.98 To rebut the inference, the school district had to prove either that the
disproportionate enrollment of blacks reflected a higher incidence of
mental retardation in blacks, or that the I.Q. tests had been validated as
classification tools for EMR placement.99 The defendants, however, failed
to prove either fact. I°
In considering the claims under the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EHA), the Larry P. court again applied an effects-test rather
than a discriminatory intent analysis. Citing the EHA antidiscrimination
provision,1 ' the court implied that it should be interpreted in a manner
similar to Title VI's antidiscrimination provisions.' °2 The opinion, how-
ever, focused primarily on the EHA regulation requiring that classification
methods be validated for the specific purpose for which it is being used.' 3
The court in Larry P. suggested that since the issue of I.Q. test valida-
tion for EMR placement was one of first impression, the allocation of the
94. 45 C.F.R. § 803(b)2 (1978).
95. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:321.
96. Id
97. Id (citing M. GERRY, supra note 49, at 3).
98. The court specifically rested its decision to shift the burden of proof to the defend-
ant on Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (1978), which applied a discriminatory
effects test to a Title VI violation. Id at 1277. Since Larry P., however, the Second Circuit
has expressly reversed the Lora holding and specified a discriminatory intent standard for
Title VI violations. Lora v. Board of Educ., 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
99. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:322.
100. Id
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(c) (1976).
102. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:323.
103. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(a) (1979).
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burden proof for EHA test validation claims should be analogized to the
Title VII effects-test analysis first enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 1"4 Applying the analysis outlined by Judge Peckham, the burden of
showing that the tests had a "manifest relationship" with EMR placement
would shift to the school district once a disproportionate impact by I.Q.
testing is demonstrated.'0° Once the school district has established that the
tests were validated, the plaintiffs could show an alternative selection proc-
ess which would reduce the adverse impact on minorities but still serve the
school district's legitimate interests."
Judge Peckham continuing the analogy with Title VII, applying the fed-
eral guidelines governing nondiscriminatory employment selection to de-
termine whether I.Q. tests had been sufficiently validated.'o 7 Rejecting the
defendant's claim that the tests were valid because they could predict fu-
ture academic performance, 08 the court concluded that construct validity
104. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:324. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the
Supreme Court held that employment tests which operate to disqualify a disproportionate
number of minorities violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act unless justified by "busi-
ness necessity." Under Griggs, once plaintiffs establish that the tests adversely affect minori-
ties, the burden of proving "business necessity" shifts to the employer. Id at 432. In
requiring that the tests be validated, the Court gave great deference to Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines. Id at 434. Subsequent decisions have not uni-
formly required that employers follow EEOC Title VII technical guidelines for test valida-
tion in Title VII cases. See Note, The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.
Compromise and Controvesy, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 605, 614-19 (1979). The Supreme Court
further refined the Griggs test in Abermarle Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), by holding
that a plaintiff may counter a "business necessity" defense by showing a less burdensome
alternative. Id at 425. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Blake v. City of
Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372-83 (9th Cir. 1979).
105. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:324, (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)).
106. Id at 551:327.
107. Id at 551:325. Cf 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.8, 1607.4(b), 1607.5(b)(5) (1979). There are
three standards of test validation: predictive, content, and construct. Predictive validity re-
fers to how well test items predict the future performance of test takers. Content validation
asseses how well test items represent the knowledge which the test purported to measure, i.e.
a typing test for a typist position. Construct validity tests the domain of skills that comprise
mental ability. See McClung, supra note 82, at 666-67.
108. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:323. Several studies have purported to demonstrate a correla-
tion between I.Q. tests and academic performance. See Cleary, Humphreys, Kendick &
Wesman, Educational Uses of Tests with Disadvantaged Children, AMERICAN PSYCHOLO-
GIST 15 (1975); Gordon & Rudert, Bad Views Concerning I.Q. Tests, 52 SOCIOLOGY OF
EDUC. 174 (1979); Guterman, . Q. Tests in Research on Social Stratification The Cross-Class
Validity of the Tests as Measures of Scholastic Aptitude, 52 SocIoLoGY OF EDUC. 163 (1979).
Application of predictive validation to tests used for labeling EMR children rather than for
establishing educational tracks in the regular curriculum has been criticized. Some argue
that a condition of mental retardation cannot be logically deduced from a mere prediction of
poor academic performance. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae, Post-Trial Memoranda of the United
States at 19, Larry P. v. Riles, [1979] 3 EHLR 551:295 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1979). It is also
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appeared appropriate.' 0 9 Attempting to avoid a head-on collision with the
educational controversy of whether I.Q. tests generally have construct va-
lidity, 0 the court noted that the important validation issue was "establish-
ing the relationship between I.Q. test scores of black children and the
characteristics justifying their placement in special EMR classes.""'
Judge Peckham then ruled that the defendants had to demonstrate that the
tests were differentially validated, that is, valid for each minority group
upon which they were used. 1 2 The courts concluded that the I.Q. tests
were not differentially validated for black EMR placement,' based on
the facts that I.Q. tests were not designed for use on blacks and that the
tests had never been examined to determine whether the disparity between
white and black scores could be eliminated through a redesign of the
tests.' 14
B. Parents in Action on Special Education v. Hannon." No Racial or
Cultural Bias in i.Q. Tests
Less than ten months after the Larry P. decision, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the use of I.Q. tests in determin-
ing EMR placement in the Chicago public school system was not discrimi-
natory despite evidence that blacks comprised eighty-two percent of the
EMR student population and only sixty-two percent of the total student
said that categorizing a child as EMR because of questionable predictions of poor academic
performance is unfair because the limited EMR curriculum limits a child's future academic
development. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:324-25. Since some of the evidence of predictive valid-
ity indicated that the tests more accurately predicted the achievements of whites than blacks,
Judge Peckham ruled that the I.Q. tests would have to be differentially validated, that is,
validated for both white and black students. Id at 551:326.
109. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:325 n.84.
110. Whether I.Q. tests have construct validity has also been debated. See A. JENSEN,
BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING, 11 (1980) (I.Q. tests have construct validity). But see Mercer,
"Test Validity," "Bias" and "'Fairness" An Analysis from the Perspective of the Sociology of
Knowledge, 9 INTERCHANGE 1 (1978-79) (I.Q. tests do not have construct validity).
I11. [1979] 3 EHLR 551:325 n.84. Judge Peckham was willing to assume, for the pur-
poses of the case, that the tests could be used appropriately on white students. Id See note
82 supra.
112. [1979] 3 EHLR 551:325. See note 145 infra. A concept of fairness underlies the
theory of differential validity. According to this theory, those employing tests should try to
identify potentially unfair influences that may inappropriately discriminate against the test
taker. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL &
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS 43 (1974). Cf. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(b), 1607.5(b)(5) (1979) (the fed-
eral guidelines on Uniform Employment Selection Procedures sometimes require an investi-
gation into the fairness of employment criteria which have a harsher impact upon various
subgroups on the basis of race, sex, or national origin).
113. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:326.
114. Id at 551:325. See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532 (1979).
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body." 5 In Parents In Action on Special Education v. Hannon (P.A.SE),
the court dismissed the plaintiffs various statutory claims of discrimina-
tion' 16 because they failed to prove racial or cultural test bias.
117
Cultural bias, according to Judge Grady, could be determined only by a
judicial review of every question on the I.Q. tests used by the school dis-
trict. " 8 The court found little in the information required by the questions
or in the language used which was peculiar to white culture." 9 Although
the court found nine culturally biased test items, Judge Grady determined
that nine incorrect answers would not result in erroneous EMR place-
ment. 1
20
The P.A. SE. court acknowledged that blacks generally score lower than
whites on I.Q. tests,12' but found that disparate impact alone, without evi-
dence that the tests caused the overrepresentation of blacks in EMR
classes, was insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination. According
to the court, no inference of test bias could be drawn if that could only be
done by "ignoring the direct evidence of fairness" which the court had
already found in the individual test items.' 22 The court accepted the de-
fendant's claim that the disparity between black and white test scores
could be explained by the effects of poverty. 23 It agreed with the defend-
115. [1980] 3 EHLR at 552:109.
116. Id at 552:108.
117. The plaintiff brought suit under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (Supp. III 1979), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), the
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976), and the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(c) (1976).
118. [1980] 3 EHLR at 552:111. Judge Grady apparently turned to an in camera inspec-
tion of the test items only after numerous unsuccessful requests of the plaintiffs to provide
expert testimony on this form of internal validation. Record, March 11, 1980, Larry P. v.
Riles, [1979] 3 EHLR 551:295 (N.D. Cal.).
119. [1979] 3 EHLR at 552:135.
120. Id. at 552:135-36.
121. Id at 552:136. For a description of the I.Q. tests discussed by the court, see note 84
supra.
122. [1980] 3 EHLR 552:136. Contra, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971). See also Gaston County, N.C. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (literacy tests
may be fair on their face but may operate unfairly due to prior discrimination).
123. [1980] 3 EHLR at 552:136. A label of mental retardation has more than an educa-
tional impact. Many state laws restrict the rights of the mentally retarded to marry, vote,
have sexual relations, and retain custody of their children. There is also evidence that a
label of mental retardation can curtail economic opportunities. See generally R. BURT, LE-
GAL RESTRICTIONS ON SEXUAL AND FAMILIAL RELATIONS OF MENTAL RETARDATES, IN
MENTAL RETARDATION: SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1977); B. FARBER,
MENTAL RETARDATION: ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 9 (1968);
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment- Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect
Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975). Thus, in
concluding that the tests were biased against the poor, the PA.S.E. court should have de-
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ant that lower test scores were caused by a delayed intellectual develop-
ment resulting from a lack of cognitive stimulation at an early age.'
24
According to the court, this lack of stimulation was "often due to factors
associated with economic poverty in the home,"' 125 and affected a greater
number of black families than other families in Chicago. 126 It observed
further that the majority of EMR students came from the areas of Chicago
with large populations of very poor blacks.
27
As in Larry P., the P.A.S.E. plaintiffs also argued that the use of I.Q.
tests was unlawful because the tests had not been validated for use in the
EMR placement of black children. 28 While Judge Grady did not directly
address the separate issue of test validation, the court impliedly rejected a
strict differential validation requirement for I.Q. tests.129 According to the
court, redesigning the tests to prevent an adverse impact on blacks would
be impossible since blacks generally score lower on almost every ques-
tion. '
30
Relying on the EHA antidiscrimination clause, the plaintiffs argued that
the defendants bore the burden of proving that the tests were fair.' 3'
Judge Grady, however, refused to shift the burden of proof to the defend-
ants because of a literal statutory interpretation. According to the court,
finding nothing in the language of the clause required "that any single
procedure . . . be affirmatively shown to be free from bias."' 32 In fact, the
court found that the very requirement of multiple evaluative procedures
implied "a recognition that one procedure standing alone, could well result
in bias."' 33 By requiring the plaintiffs to bear the full burden of proving
discrimination under the EHA, P.A.SE. failed to follow its only prece-
dent, Larry P. 1
34
cided whether such bias is legally permissible, as affirmative state actions burdening the
poor can be unlawful. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).




128. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum, at 11, P.A.S.E. v. Hannon, [1980] 3 EHLR
552:108 (W.D. I11.).
129. [1980] 3 EHLR 552:138-39. Specifically, the court rejected the contention that test
items on which blacks scored lower be eliminated, a method previously used to standardize
the test for women. See note 76 supra.
130. Id at 139.
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C) (1976). For full quotation, see note 46 supra.
132. [1980] 3 EHLR at 552:137.
133. Id.
134. See notes 101-06 and accompanying text supra.
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III. BEYOND LARRY P. AND P.A.S.E.: WHAT STANDARDS OF PROOF
FOR DISPARATE RACIAL IMPACT?
Future courts faced with discrimination claims arising from the use of
I.Q. tests will have to decide whether the disproportionate enrollment of
blacks in EMR classes will constitute prima facie discrimination under Ti-
tle VI and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, meriting a
shift of the burden of rebutting an inference of discrimination to the de-
fendant. The conflicting conclusions and rationales of the Larry P. and
the P.A.SE. courts make their precedential value unclear.
Whether disparate impact alone can establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination under Title VI is an open, but much discussed, question. The
Lau effects test survives but its application may be limited to areas of fed-
eral funding governed by specific, affirmative federal regulations. Accord-
ing to Bakke dicta, a Title VI effects-test standard may not exist when state
action creates an explicit racial classification, except where federal regula-
tions place an affirmative duty on federal aid recipients. 35 Fullilove dicta
indicates that voluntary federal funding may be subject to specific admin-
istrative restrictions designed to remedy the effects of prior discrimina-
tion. 136
Whether the use of I.Q. tests for EMR placement qualifies for an effects
test analysis is unclear. In Lau, the Title VI enforcement agency (HEW)
issued guidelines imposing a specific duty on school districts to supply re-
medial language instruction where the inability to speak English impaired
participation in the educational program, a violation of Title VI regula-
tions. 137 The 1977 Public Works Employment Act mandated the MBE set-
aside program at issue in Fullilove. In contrast, the HEW memorandum
on special education, relied upon in Larry P. 138 to strengthen Title VI non-
discrimination regulations, imposes no affirmative duty to eliminate the
use of evaluative devices causing discriminatory impact. Instead, the
memorandum states that "additional or substitute materials or procedures
which do not have such adverse impact must be employed."' 39 Thus,
plaintiffs seeking the elimination of I.Q. testing under a Title VI effects-test
theory may have the burden of proving that an affirmative duty to elimi-
nate the tests exists, that is, that additional tests could not sufficiently re-
duce the adverse impact so as to be nondiscriminatory. Given the distinct
135. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra.
138. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
139. See M. GERRY, supra note 49, at 3.
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definitions of test bias employed by the Larry P. and P.A.SE. courts and
the P.A.S.E adoption of a poverty explanation for lower black test scores,
gaining a Title VI effects-test standard may be difficult.
Whether a demonstration of disparate racial impact is sufficient to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant under the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act (EHA) is, of course, a matter of statutory construc-
tion. The PA.S.E. court examined the language of the EHA and
concluded that nothing in the Act authorized the shifting of the burden of
proof. In Larry P., Judge Peckham decided to shift the burden of proof to
the defendant based on an analogy to Title VII.
The Larry P court's reasoning is problematic for two reasons. First, the
court suggested that the allocation of the burden of proof announced in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 140 be applied to Larry P, " apparently on the
basis that evaluative materials for both special education and employment
must be validated according to federal regulations. The ruling in Griggs
that a disparate racial impact caused by employment selection criteria can
justify shifting the burden of rebutting an inference of discrimination to
the defendant was not anchored on regulatory validation requirements.
Rather, the linchpin of Griggs was the Congressional intent to prohibit
employment discrimination occasioned by employment tests that are not
job-related. '42 Thus, the justification for applying an effects-test to a fed-
eral statute prohibiting discrimination appears to turn on the scope of the
discrimination Congress intended to prohibit by the statute.
43
140. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See notes 96-97 and accompanying text supra.
141. [1979] 3 EHLR at 551:324. Cf. 42 C.F.R. § 121a.532(a)(2) (1979); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4 (1979). The defendants argued that the constitutional standard of test validation
enunciated in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), should apply to I.Q. testing for
EMR placement. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that, where employment discrimination
via testing was alleged under the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiffs had to show discrimi-
natory intent. The court also held that the defendants would not be held to the Title VII
validation standard of job relatedness, but could rebut the inference of constitutional dis-
crimination by proving that the employment test and the job were rationally related. Id at
247. This constitutional standard also has been applied to Title VI claims alleging discrimi-
nation via testing when the statutory claim is linked with a constitutional one. See Baker v.
City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1968); Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244
(M.D. Fla. 1979); Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
Judge Peckham recognized no difference between the Davis and Griggs standards, [1979]
3 EHLR at 551:324, and thus never addressed the issue of whether a standard of discrimina-
tory intent might be applicable to the EHA.
142. According to the Griggs court, Congress intended Title VII to address the conse-
quences of employment discrimination and to place the burden on the employer to show
that all job criteria are job-related. 401 U.S. at 432.
143. Id at 430. Accord, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 285 (an
examination of the legislative intent behind Title VI indicates Title VI proscribes only those
racial classifications that would violate the constitution).
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After the Larry P. and P.A.SE decisions, it is also unclear what de-
fenses can defeat a claim of discriminatory racial impact under Title VI or
the EHA. The Larry P. court imposed a Griggs-like "educational neces-
sity" defense and a differential validation requirement on I.Q. testing for
EMR placement"' on the rationale that since federal regulations require
the validation of special education classification tools and employment se-
lection criteria, the same validation standards should be applied to special
education. This appears to stretch the education-employment analogy too
far. Strict differential validation is no longer a prerequisite to the lawful
use of employment tests; only a standard of test fairness is required.' 45 In
addition, courts and Congress have accorded great deference to the educa-
tional policy decisions of school authorities that may have a racially defin-
able impact but which fall short of constitutional violations.'46 On the
other hand, P.A.S.E would allow each judge to formulate his own defini-
tion of test validation or test bias. Such discretion to local judges would
seem contrary to one of the purposes of the EHA, which is to encourage
national uniformity in the procedural safeguards afforded students and
parents in special education classification processes. 147
144. See notes 104-13 and accompanying text supra.
145. Under the 1970 interpretive guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, employment tests were required to be differently validated for each mi-
nority group involved when there was a sufficient number of minorities to make the
validation technically feasible. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(b), 1607.5(b)(5) (1977). The burden of
proving the absence of technical feasibility by positive evidence lay with the employer. 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4(b) (1977). In 1978, the EEOC, the Civil Service Commission, and the De-
partments of Labor and Justice adopted the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 to 1607.18 (1979). Differential validation is no longer re-
quired for employment tests. Rather, the guidelines incorporate a concept of test fairness.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(8) (1979). Employers must keep data on the test results of minori-
ties, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(A) to 1607.4(B); 1607.15(A)(1) to 1607.15(A)(2) (1979). Where
there is an adverse impact on minorities, employers must conduct fairness studies if there are
sufficient numbers to make such studies technically feasible. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(8)(e)
(1979). Although the guidelines do not define fairness, they indicate that an adverse impact
on minorities signals a need to investigate a test's fairness. Id See Note, The Uniform
Guidelines on Employer Selection Procedures: Compromises and Controversies, 28 CATH.
U.L. REV. 605, 612-19, 625-27 (1979).
146. Congress has stated that de facto racial imbalances are not unlawful with respect to
school desegregation. See, e.g., Title VI of Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1976);
Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1703, 1704, 1705, 1715, 1754 (1976). The
courts have also shown great deference to the decisions of school authorities. See Monroe v.
Board of Comm'ns, 505 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1974) (school closing); Ellis v. Board of Public
Instruction, 465 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973) (school closing);
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967) (courts'
authority to review school board's actions is not regulatory); Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp.
163 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd 384 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967) (curriculum and operation of schools lies
with school board).
147. The EHA establishes a system of minimal procedural safeguards for children and
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Under present case law, it is uncertain whether Title VI or the EHA
embodies an effects-test standard of discrimination. Unlike Title VI, how-
ever, no court has examined the congressional intent behind the EHA pro-
vision prohibiting the use of evaluative materials that are racially and
culturally discriminatory. Such an examination might shed light on the
appropriate analysis for charges of discriminatory impact under the EHA
as well as on the defenses that can defeat such claims.
IV. A DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT STANDARD FOR THE EHA?
Allegations that the use of I.Q. tests for EMR placement violates EHA's
antidiscrimination provision poses the question of whether disparate racial
impact alone can establish prima facie discrimination under the Act. A
recent Supreme Court decision examined whether a discriminatory effects
or intent standard should apply to another federal antidiscrimination stat-
ute, the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA).'4n In finding an effects-test
appropriate, the Court set out a method of statutory analysis which might
help to establish the proper interpretation of prima facie discrimination
under the EHA.
In Board of Education v. Harris,149 the New York City School Board
sought to enjoin HEW from terminating funds being received under the
ESAA. HEW had decided to cut off funding after determining that the
school board's method of assigning teachers was discriminatory and vio-
lated the Act."'5 The school board charged that HEW could not eliminate
funding because it failed to prove any discriminatory intent. The Supreme
Court held that a statistical showing that black teachers were assigned
parents during the classification process. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). These safeguards include
the rights of parents or guardians to prior written notice of placement decisions,
Id § 1415(b)(1)(c); to appeal the decision to the state educational agency, Id. § 1415(b)(2),
and to file suit in federal district court. Id § 1415(e)(2). In order to receive EHA funds,
states must demonstrate that it has established procedures complying with § 1415. Id.
§ 1412(5)(A). The EHA also requires local educational agencies seeking state EHA funds to
provide assurances that the statutory procedural safeguards will be maintained. Id
§ 1414(a)(7).
148. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (Supp. III 1979).
149. 444 U.S. 130 (1979).
150. Id. at 135. See 20 U.S.C. § 3196(c)(1)(D) (Supp. III 1979). According to the Act no
educational agency is eligible for assistance if after June 23, 1972 the agency:
had in effect any practice, policy or procedure which results in the disproportionate
demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel from minority groups in
conjunction with desegregation or the implementation of any plan or the conduct
of any activity described in this section, or otherwise engaged in discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin in the hiring, promotion, or assignment
of employees of the agency (or other personnel for whom the agency has any ad-
ministrative responsibility).
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more often to predominantly black schools and less often to predomi-
nantly white schools was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination under the ESAA. The burden, therefore, shifted to the board
to rebut the prima facie case by showing "educational necessity."' 5 Ac-
cording to the Court, the decision to apply a Griggs analysis was justified
by the overall structure of the Act, the congressional statement of purpose
and policy, the legislative history, and the context of the violated provi-
sion. 152
The Harris decision is useful since it interprets a statute analogous to the
EHA. Both the ESAA and the EHA are specialized acts designed to effec-
tuate national policies through voluntary funding programs.5 3  The
EHA's statement of findings and purpose, like ESAA's, demonstrates that
Congress was concerned with the effect, not the intent, of educational poli-
cies. 154 Congress found that it was in the national interest for the federal
government to assist local and state authorities lacking adequate financial
resources to provide special education programs in order to ensure equal
protection of the law.' 55 The purpose of the EHA is to ensure an appropri-
151. 444 U.S. at 151.
152. Id. at 140-41.
153. Both the ESAA and the EHA are specific grant programs designed to encourage
local educational programs under Title VI or § 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. A pur-
pose of the ESAA is "to encourage the voluntary elimination, reduction, or prevention of
minority group isolation in elementary or secondary schools .. " 20 U.S.C. § 3192(b)(2)
(Supp. III 1979). To effect this purpose, Congress has authorized $415 million in grants and
contracts to educational authorities in 1980 and for three succeeding years. 20 U.S.C. § 3194
(Supp. II1 1979). The requirements of the ESAA are incumbent only on participants and
thus a violation of the act does not result in a cut-off of federal funding as would a Title VI
violation. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. at 150 (1979). The EHA is similarly narrow in
focus. Its purpose is to ensure "a free appropriate education" to all handicapped children.
Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601(c), 84 Stat. 121 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(a),
89 Stat. 775 (1975). Congress provides each state participant additional funds based on the
number of children served by the special education program and the yearly average per
pupil cost in the United States. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1976). Presumably, a violation of the
EHA would not affect standing to receive other federal funding.
154. According to the Harris court, the ESAA's purpose of reducing minority isolation
and improving the quality of education for all children focused on actual effect. 444 U.S. at
141. Similarly, the purpose of the EHA is to affect conditions that did not exist prior to the
Act. See note 148 infra.
155. Among the specific Congressional findings are that: (I) the special educational
needs of handicapped children were not being fully met; (2) more than half of the handi-
capped children in the United States do not receive appropriate educational services permit-
ting them full quality of opportunity; (3) state and local educational agencies have a
responsibility to provide education for handicapped children, which they are unable to meet
because of inadequate financial resources; and (4) it is in the national interest for the federal
government to provide financial assistance to meet the educational needs of handicapped
children. Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601(b), 84 Stat. 121 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-
142, § 3(2), 89 Stat. 775 (1975).
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ate education for handicapped children and to protect the rights of such
children and their parents. 156 In the EHA, as in the ESAA, one of the
eligibility criteria prohibits discrimination.1
57
A major congressional concern in drafting the EHA was to ensure that
children with handicaps were properly classified by state authorities.158
This is reflected in the EHA's provisions requiring individualized educa-
tional programs for handicapped students, 5 9 due process protections for
the classification process, 160 and placement of children in regular class-
rooms when possible.161 A specific congressional desire to avoid erroneous
classification of children is manifest in the EHA requirement that testing
and evaluative materials be "selected and administered so as not to be
racially and culturally discriminatory."1 62 Congress adopted this language
to effectuate the policy of providing full educational opportunities to all
handicapped children.
163
The plain language of the provision indicates a congressional intent to
guard against discriminatory impact. This conclusion is supported by
statements of representatives who believed racial and ethnic factors might
contribute to misclassification."6 Apparently, Congress never envisioned
156. Id §601(c).
157. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 3196(c)(1)(D) (Supp. III 1979), supra note 150, with 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(5)(C) (1976), supra note 43.
158. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare stated that it was "deeply
concerned about practices and procedures which result in classifying children as having
handicapping conditions when in fact they do not have such conditions." S. REP. No.168,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in (1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1450. As a
result of this concern, the Senate version of the EHA was designed to "focus directly on the
problem of erroneous classification and labeling of children." S. REP. No. 168 at 10, re-
printed in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1434.
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(4) (Supp. 11 1978).
160. Id § 1415.
161. Id. § 1412(5)(B).
162. Id. § 1412(5)(C). See note 43 supra.
163. The predecessor to the EHA was the Education of the Handicapped Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974). The Senate version of the bill contained the
provision now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C) (1976); the House version did not. In the
Conference Committee, the Senate version was adopted, "changing the goal from providing
an opportunity for free appropriate public education for all handicapped children to provid-
ing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children." CONG REP. No. 1026, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4206, 4257.
164. One year prior to its consideration of the EHA, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare examined the 1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974), and noted that "racial and ethnic factors may contribute to
misclassification as mentally retarded." S. REP. No.1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6389. This observation was reiterated during
the House debates on the EHA. Representative Miller of California pointed out that some
testing devices used to identify handicapped children were discriminatory because they were
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that educators would intentionally use testing materials as instruments of
discrimination. Rather, as the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare noted, "the mechanistic ease of testing should not become so para-
mount . . . that the negative effects are overlooked."' 16 5 Moreover, noth-
ing in the legislative history demonstrates an intent to mitigate the effects
test language or purpose of the EHA eligibility provision.
By analogy to the Harris opinion and by review of legislative history, a
prima facie case of discrimination under the EHA antidiscrimination pro-
vision will be found upon evidence of a disproportionate impact. Under
this theory, if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that I.Q. tests have an adverse
impact on minorities, the defendant school board will have the burden of
proving that the use of I.Q. tests is an "educational necessity." Presuma-
bly, the Title VII analogy in Harris would also encompass the plaintiff's
Title VII right to foil an "educational necessity" defense with a showing of
a less segregative alternative. 166
VI. CONCLUSION
Erroneous misclassification as EMR may deny children valuable civil,
economic, and educational opportunities. I.Q. testing that results in a dis-
proporionate enrollment of minority children in EMR classes raises a
specter of racial discrimination. Given the widespread use of I.Q. testing
in educational fields, requiring proof of discriminatory intent could create
an almost insurmountable barrier for plaintiffs. Thus, whether a showing
of disparate racial impact establishes prima facie discrimination under ap-
plicable federal statutes is a crucial question. A Title VI effects test exists,
culturally biased and impacted unfairly upon blacks. See 121 CONG. REC. H7763 (daily ed.
July 29, 1975) (remarks by Rep. Miller).
165. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS
1425, 1453.
166. A less burdensome alternative theory, although not addressed by the Harris court,
would be appropriate for the EHA. Not only would this theory be in keeping with the
discriminatory effects standard evolving from Griggs, see note 95 supra, but it would also
encourage local investigation into new and potentially improved evaluation devices that are
certain to be developed as knowledge about mental retardation increases. Some experts in
the special education field advocating the elimination of I.Q. tests have introduced substitute
alternative assessment techniques that consider environment. See J. MERCER, PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ASSESSMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN, ISSUES IN CLASSIFICATION 6
(1975) (proposes multicultural pluralistic assessment procedures based on a child's cultural
background); N. HOaBS, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 4 (1975) (proposes a classification sys-
tem based on the construction of profiles of the assets and liabilities of a child in particular
settings to be used to set specific goals for the child in each setting). Proof that these alterna-
tives to I.Q. tests are reliable and impact less harshly on minorities could result in the elimi-
nation of I.Q. testing.
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but its application is still unclear. To add to the confusion, Larry P. and
PA.SE are split on whether the EHA incorporates an effects test.
Recently, however, in Harris v. Board of Education the Supreme Court
suggested a theory of statutory analysis for a federal antidiscrimination
statute similar to Title VI. The criteria set forth in that case could logically
be extended to analysis of EHA claims. Under this theory a discrimina-
tory effects standard could be applied to claims under the EHA antidis-
crimination provision. Such an analysis would support the congressional
desire to guard against racially and culturally discriminatory classifications
and guarantee minority school children the opportunity for appropriate
education.
Mary Elizabeth Frederick

